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Conceptual Clarification
and Policy-Related
Science: The Case of
Chemical Hormesis
Kevin Elliott

University of Notre Dame

This paper examines the epistemological warrant for a toxicological phenomenon known as chemical hormesis. First, it argues that conceptual confusion
contributes signiªcantly to current disagreements about the status of chemical
hormesis as a biological hypothesis. Second, it analyzes seven distinct concepts
of chemical hormesis, arguing that none are completely satisfactory. Finally,
it suggests three ramiªcations of this analysis for ongoing debates about the
epistemological status of chemical hormesis. This serves as a case study supporting the value of philosophical methodologies such as conceptual clariªcation for addressing contemporary scientiªc disputes, including policy-related
scientiªc disputes that may be heavily inºuenced by social and political
factors.
Introduction

In recent years, several factors have stimulated research concerning the biological effects of low levels of anthropogenic chemicals in the
environment. First of all, recent research has associated very low doses of
some chemicals, especially chemicals that “mimic” hormones such as estrogen, with phenomena such as reproductive cancer, low sperm counts
in male organisms, alteration of immune function, and decline in species populations (see Birnbaum 1994; Colborn et al. 1996). Second, chemical manufacturers are being held accountable for the effects of toxic
chemicals, so they need to determine the limits of their liability or responsibility. Third, new techniques are making it possible to measure the
low-level effects of chemicals that could not be measured in the past.
Fourth, risk management by government agencies such as the EnvironI would like to thank two anonymous referees for this journal and especially Kristin
Shrader-Frechette for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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mental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
has helped to reduce pollutant levels in the environment, so it is now more
realistic for toxicologists to study the effects of these substances at lower
doses.
This interest in the low-level effects of toxic chemicals has stimulated
study of chemical hormesis (e.g., Stebbing 1982; Davis and Svendsgaard
1990; Calabrese and Baldwin 1998b). Although no current deªnition of
‘chemical hormesis’ is entirely satisfactory, the phenomenon is characterized by a chemical’s production of low-dose biological effects that are the
opposite of the toxic effects produced at higher dose levels by the same
chemical (see ªgure 1).1 Some researchers are suggesting that chemical
hormesis is a generalizable phenomenon with signiªcant policy implications (Calabrese and Baldwin 1999b; Stebbing 1997; Sielken and
Stevenson 1998; Teeguarden et al. 1998), but other scientists have been
slow to accept the legitimacy of such claims (Davis and Svendsgaard 1990;
Davis and Farland 1998). The ªrst section of this paper argues that much
of this disagreement about the warrant for the existence and
generalizability of chemical hormesis can be traced to conceptual confusion. In the hope of alleviating this confusion, the next section outlines
seven distinct (though not mutually exclusive) concepts of chemical
hormesis present in recent articles and argues that none of them are completely satisfactory. Finally, the last section argues that the conceptual
clariªcation provided in this paper suggests at least three ramiªcations for
ongoing debates concerning the epistemological status of chemical
hormesis.
Clarifying these concepts and debates is important not only for its contribution to scientiªc understanding in disciplines such as epidemiology,
toxicology, and pharmacology, but also because of the implications of this
case study for public policy and for philosophy of science. The removal of
the last one or two percent of any pollutant from the environment can be
extremely costly. Therefore, an ongoing conºict exists between the medical and environmental communities on the one hand and the industrial
community on the other hand regarding the importance of removing low
levels of toxins from the environment. The hypothesis of chemical
hormesis is central to this conºict, because the existence and general1. Alcohol provides a good example of this sort of dose-response. At low to moderate
dose levels, alcohol appears to decrease human mortality rates below control levels. At higher
doses, however, alcohol increases human mortality rates above controls (e.g., Gordon and
Doyle 1987). Not all researchers would consider this to be a case of chemical hormesis, but
it serves as a commonly-recognized example of the sort of dose-response curves that are
characteristic of chemical hormesis (see ªgure 1).
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Figure 1. Examples of the general form of hormetic dose-response relationships. The bottom curve could represent the relationship between alcohol and human mortality, whereas the top curve could represent the hormetic effects of
growth inhibitors on plant growth.
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izability of chemical hormesis would support the claim made by the industrial community that low levels of contamination are not harmful (and
are perhaps even helpful!). Furthermore, this examination contributes to
the philosophy of science by illustrating the way that conceptual or
epistemological analysis can reveal philosophical conºicts at the heart of
scientiªc debates that appear to revolve around substantive facts. Ernst
Mayr claims that much of the recent progress in evolutionary biology has
been a result of conceptual clariªcation, not a consequence of improved empirical tests (1988). This paper provides a case study supporting the value
of conceptual clariªcation in the evaluation of disputes even in a highly
empirical and applied scientiªc discipline such as toxicology.
Finally, the conceptual clariªcation provided in this paper supports the
efªcacy of philosophical methodologies for addressing disputes over policy-related science. In her article on radiation hormesis (this issue, section
2), Kristin Shrader-Frechette draws attention to Deborah Mayo’s (1991)
division of thinkers who acknowledge the value-laden character of risk assessment into two groups. On one side, the “sociologists” insist that social
and political values are inseparable from scientiªc hypotheses related to
risk assessment (e.g., Wildavsky and Douglas 1984). On the other side,
“metascientists” believe that methodological (as opposed to social and
political) value judgments are sufªcient for evaluating scientiªc hypotheses (e.g., Mayo 1991). Shrader-Frechette provides support for the metascientists’ position by arguing that traditional philosophy-of-science analysis is sufªcient for resolving the current dispute over radiobiological
hormesis.
Similarly, this paper supports the efªcacy of philosophical approaches
(in this case, conceptual analysis) for addressing disputes in policy-related
science. The ªrst sections of the paper introduce some of the social and political factors that contribute to disputes over hormesis, but section III argues that, at present, conceptual clariªcation is sufªcient for showing the
evidence for chemical hormesis to be unconvincing. Use of the term
‘chemical hormesis’ in recent literature suggests the existence of one particular, relatively universal low-dose phenomenon, but careful attention to
the multiple concepts of hormesis in use reveals that the existence of such
a phenomenon is not supported by current research. Because the two primary sources of alleged hormetic biological effects are toxic chemicals and
radiation, this paper and the accompanying article by Shrader-Frechette
provide signiªcant support for the claim that the philosophy of science, as
opposed to sociology, is presently adequate for resolving scientiªc disputes
related to hormesis.
One might object to the choice of philosophical methodology (i.e., conceptual clariªcation and analysis) employed in this paper by arguing
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that it incorrectly presupposes that science is progressive only when scientiªc research proceeds with conceptual precision. However, this paper
claims only that, at the present time, adequate evaluation of the chemical
hormesis hypothesis and of its implications for public policy requires increased conceptual precision. This does not mean that conceptual “looseness” has not been beneªcial for previous research concerning the hormesis
phenomenon or that it cannot sometimes play a valuable role in scientiªc
research in general.
I. The Role of Conceptual Confusion in Current Debates

This section summarizes recent debates about the hypothesis that chemical hormesis exists and is generalizable and argues that conceptual confusion plays an important role in these debates. To date, perhaps the most
signiªcant work on chemical hormesis has been done by Edward Calabrese
and Linda Baldwin, who recently completed an extensive literature search
designed to uncover evidence for chemical hormesis in previous toxicology
research. They concluded that chemical hormesis “appeared to be highly
generalizable” (1998b, p. 3) and that claims about “the concept of
hormesis (i.e., low-dose stimulation/high-dose inhibition)” are at odds
with the presuppositions underlying “the cancer risk assessment practices
by United States regulatory agencies such as the EPA, FDA, and OSHA
which assume that cancer risk is linear in the low-dose area” (1998b,
p. VIII-1). Similarly, Justin Teeguarden, et al. recently claimed that the
evidence for hormesis in recent literature “challenges current approaches
to carcinogen testing that are limited in their usefulness by their narrow
focus on linear dose responses and toxic effects. Indications of hormesis in
carcinogenesis further legitimize the notion that current linear low-dose
approaches to risk assessment and human drug safety studies are ºawed”
(1998, p. 257, italics added). Similar claims can be found in many other
articles (e.g., Sielken and Stevenson 1998; Johnson and Bruunsgaard
1998; Appleby 1998).
So far, however, governmental agencies have been slow to accept the evidence for chemical hormesis. Ortwin Renn reports that “regulatory agencies prefer to ignore this phenomenon as not yet proven or to deem it irrelevant for pursuing their public mandate” (1998, p. 431). J. Michael Davis
and William Farland, two EPA scientists, do not think that present information is sufªcient to justify the hypothesis that chemical hormesis
(which they refer to as BELLE—Biological Effects of Low-Level Exposures) is a replicable phenomenon: “At present it is not clear that general
principles pertaining to BELLE exist for United States EPA scientists to
consider. Thus, those who wish to advance the consideration of BELLE in
public health regulatory contexts bear a certain burden of proof to show
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enough evidence to support a conclusion that a beneªt actually results
from low-level exposure to an environmental pollutant” (Davis and
Farland 1998, p. 380). In short, the warrant for chemical hormesis is a
matter of dispute.
In a series of recent papers (2000a; 2000b; 2000c; 2000d; 2000e) designed to justify their recent research in support of hormesis, Calabrese
and Baldwin canvass the history of the biological hypotheses of both
chemical and radiation hormesis from the late nineteenth century to the
present. They suggest several explanations for the temporary demise of
each hypothesis during the middle decades of the twentieth century.
Calabrese and Baldwin claim that the demise of the radiation hormesis hypothesis is largely understandable, given its limited database and the
difªculty of reproducing ªndings associated with the hypothesis (2000e,
p. 92). Shrader-Frechette (this issue, section 5) elucidates a number of
other reasons that this demise continues to be understandable, including
the fact that radiation hormesis conºicts with a number of studies that
show harmful results of very low doses of ionizing radiation.
In contrast, Calabrese and Baldwin claim that the chemical hormesis
hypothesis has been linked to so much scientiªc evidence and has been associated with the laboratories and students of such inºuential scientists
(including Louis Pasteur, Robert Koch, Wilhelm Ostwald, and Charles
Richet) that its demise is initially quite surprising (2000e, p. 92). In order
to account for this demise, Calabrese and Baldwin rely heavily on sociological explanations (see e.g., Calabrese and Baldwin 1999b, p. 727). First,
some hormesis researchers and many proponents of the medical practice of
homeopathy attempted to use hormesis to explain the effects of homeopathic remedies, thus linking hormesis with a disreputable and severely-criticized medical research program (2000e, p. 92). Second, the
low-dose region of dose-response curves did not, in the middle of the
twentieth century, appear to have many practical implications that could
provide an incentive for further research (2000b, p. 37). Third, close educational connections between important critics of chemical hormesis (e.g.,
A. J. Clark) and many of the biostatisticians who pioneered the development of dose-response models further minimized the potential for
hormetic effects to be integrated into mainstream toxicological research
(Calabrese and Baldwin 2000b, p. 37).
On one hand, this paper does not deny the contributions that Calabrese
and Baldwin’s sociological explanations may provide for explaining many
features of hormesis debates. On the other hand, it does argue that, at
present, philosophy-of-science analysis is sufªcient for rejecting the chemical hormesis hypothesis, because conceptual analysis pinpoints the
insufªciency of current evidence for any particular hormetic phenomenon.
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First, examination of the concepts used by proponents and opponents of
the hormesis hypothesis suggests that they tend to use different concepts
of chemical hormesis. Proponents of chemical hormesis often focus on
mechanistic concepts of chemical hormesis that associate it with one or two
relatively unitary sets of phenomena. For example, Calabrese and Baldwin
tried to group the instances of chemical hormesis that they found in their
literature search into two “broad types”—“overcompensation hormesis”
and “direct stimulation hormesis” (1998b, p. 1; see also Calabrese and
Baldwin 1998c; Stebbing 1997). In contrast, opponents of chemical
hormesis tend to employ operational concepts that emphasize a multiplicity of phenomena that might be considered hormetic. EPA scientists prefer to speak of “U-shaped dose response curves”2 in general, or they use the
generic term “biological effects of low-level exposures” (Davis and
Svendsgaard 1990; Davis and Farland 1998).
Although it is very difªcult to speculate about the reasons for these
conceptual differences, it appears that they are probably not the result of
deep methodological disagreements between, for example, proponents of a
mechanistic approach to biological science as opposed to proponents of a
more epidemiological, “empiricist” approach. As section II of this paper
indicates, both Calabrese and Baldwin and Davis and Svendsgaard employ
both operational and mechanistic concepts throughout their work.
Therefore, it appears that these researchers may focus on different concepts
in some of their arguments because of the differing implications that these
concepts suggest for the legitimacy of the hormesis hypothesis.
These conceptual differences between proponents and opponents of
chemical hormesis contribute to epistemological disputes in at least two
ways. First, the use of different concepts tends to support different conclusions about the plausibility that chemical hormesis exists as a replicable
phenomenon, given current evidence. Calabrese and Baldwin’s mechanistic
concept of “overcompensation” hormesis is based on Anthony Stebbing’s
suggestion that it is adaptively advantageous for organisms to develop
2. These curves are called “U-shaped dose-response curves” because the biological effects of toxic chemicals equal the level of controls at some dosage close to zero, the effects
drop below the level of controls at slightly higher doses, and the effects rise to levels above
the controls at still higher doses, thus producing a U-shaped curve. The effects of alcohol
on human mortality could be represented by a U-shaped curve of this sort (see the bottom
curve in ªgure 1). Furthermore, a “U-shaped dose-response curve” could also be inverted,
thus representing very low dose effects that rise above the levels of controls and high dose
effects that drop below the levels of controls (see the top curve in ªgure 1). For example, if
a toxic chemical inhibited the growth of an organism at high doses but increased its
growth at extremely low doses, it would produce a dose-response curve with an inverted-U
shape. Throughout this paper, I will follow the example of Davis and Svendsgaard (1990)
and refer to both upright- and inverted-U curves as U-shaped-dose-response curves.
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regulatory processes that temporarily “overreact” to stressors, thus producing stimulation at low doses (Stebbing 1997). Given the plausibility of
this evolutionary mechanism for chemical hormesis, it tends to support a
conclusion in favor of the existence of chemical hormesis (Calabrese and
Baldwin 1998c, p. 355). In contrast, Davis and Svendsgaard examine the
legitimacy of the hormetic hypothesis solely by looking for evidence of
U-shaped dose-response curves. Given this concept of chemical hormesis,
they suggest that chemical hormesis may not be a replicable phenomenon,
even though evidence exists for hormetic-looking phenomena, because
many cases of U-shaped dose-response curves may be spurious or may result from confounding factors and complex interactive effects of chemicals
(1990, p. 75–77).
Second, the different concepts employed by proponents and opponents
of chemical hormesis suggest different conclusions about the
generalizability of chemical hormesis given current evidence. On the one
hand, Calabrese and Baldwin’s isolation of two “types” of hormetic phenomena implicitly suggests that chemical hormesis can be associated with
two relatively unitary sets of phenomena. This in turn suggests that
hormesis might occur consistently under the conditions that produce
those two phenomena (overcompensation and direct stimulation). Having
found evidence for hormetic effects of each type in previous toxicology
studies, Calabrese and Baldwin concluded that hormesis appeared to be
highly generalizable (1998b, p. 3). On the other hand, the frequency of
chemical hormesis is much more difªcult to justify if one employs the operational concepts favored by opponents of chemical hormesis. For example, Davis and Svendsgaard report numerous different mechanisms (as
well as invalid study designs) that might explain the U-shaped doseresponse curves sometimes observed in toxicology studies. By emphasizing the multiplicity of factors that might produce occasional U-shaped
dose-response curves, they cast doubt on the likelihood that chemical
hormesis is a unitary explanatory phenomenon for which a speciªable frequency of occurrence can be given (1990, p. 75–77).
II. Conceptual Clarification of Chemical Hormesis

If conceptual confusion is hindering epistemological debates about the existence of chemical hormesis, then it is important to understand the precise nature of this confusion in order to determine its implications for the
truth or falsity of claims about hormesis. This section attempts to distinguish seven distinct (though not mutually exclusive) concepts of chemical
hormesis found in recent articles. I will call these concepts (1)
“U-shaped-dose-response-curve hormesis,” (2) “low-dose stimulation/high-dose inhibition hormesis,” (3) “beneªcial hormesis,” (4) “over-
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compensation hormesis,” (5) “direct-stimulation hormesis,” (6) “multiple-effects hormesis,” and (7) “adaptive hormesis.” For the sake of analysis,
this paper groups the ªrst three concepts as operational, the second three
as mechanistic, and the last concept as genetic (i.e., focusing on origination); however, the notion of an “operational” concept as opposed to a
“mechanistic” concept is not developed here in any special, technical
sense. For the purposes of this paper, an operational concept can be regarded as one that is deªned in terms of its criteria of application, which
in the case of hormesis involves the measurement of some biological endpoint; a mechanistic concept involves the isolation of a system in which
hormetic phenomena are produced by the interaction of parts according to
causal laws (see, e.g., Bridgman 1927; Wimsatt 1976; Bechtel and Richardson 1993). Elucidating these seven concepts, I argue that none of them
are completely satisfactory, considering the present state of research concerning chemical hormesis. Section III suggests, however, that further speciªcation and examination of mechanistic concepts may prove to be the
most fruitful source of future research in support of the hormesis hypothesis.
The ªrst and perhaps dominant concept of chemical hormesis,
“U-shaped-dose-response-curve hormesis,” is deªned as any non-spurious
biological effect of a chemical that produces opposite effects at higher
doses (an effect of this sort can be represented by a U-shaped dose-response
curve, where the x-axis represents dose and the y-axis represents effect on a
biological endpoint). For example, lead exposure normally increases the latency of auditory and visual evoked potentials in the human brainstem,
but children exposed to very low doses of lead exhibit decreased latency of
auditory and visual evoked potentials (Davis and Svendsgaard 1990,
p. 74). From the beginning, the study of “chemical hormesis” has revolved
around the search for U-shaped dose-response curves of toxic chemicals (see
Calabrese and Baldwin 1999a). This concept can still be found, both implicitly and explicitly, throughout the literature on hormesis. The criteria
by which Calabrese and Baldwin examined studies for evidence of chemical hormesis were designed to accord hormetic status to any U-shaped
dose response (1998b, p. III-4). In at least one article, they refer to
hormetic responses as “U- or inverted U-shaped dose-response relationships” (Calabrese and Baldwin 1998c, p. 353). Davis and Svendsgaard addressed the issue of chemical hormesis by examining “U-shaped doseresponse curves” (1990). Similarly, Johnson and Bruunsgaard associate
hormesis with a low dose response “opposite to that seen at high doses”
(1998, p. 263).
“Low-dose-stimulation/high-dose-inhibition hormesis” is a second
concept of chemical hormesis, which I deªne as any instance of
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“U-shaped-dose-response-curve hormesis” that involves the stimulation of
an endpoint at low doses and inhibition of the same endpoint at higher
doses. For example, at doses of 10–8- 10–7 M, the cytotoxic agent
Adriamycin inhibits cell growth, but it stimulates cell growth at doses of
10–10–10–9 M (Vichi and Tritton 1989, p. 2679). This concept of chemical
hormesis is very similar to the previous concept, but it excludes U-shaped
dose- response curves that involve low dose inhibition and high dose stimulation (e.g., the bottom curve in ªgure 1). This might not seem to be an important stipulation, but this second concept has been one of the most
inºuential in the literature on chemical hormesis. The term “hormesis”
was originally proposed by Southam and Ehrlich in 1943 to refer to “the
stimulation of biological processes by subinhibitory levels of toxicants”
(Calabrese and Baldwin 1998b, p. 1, italics added; Southam and Ehrlich
1943). In a number of articles, Calabrese and Baldwin follow this
deªnition and refer to chemical hormesis as “low dose stimulation/high
dose inhibition” (1998a, p. 230; see also Calabrese, et al. 1987). Many
other authors also use this second concept (e.g., Stebbing 1982; Foran
1998).
A third operational concept, “beneªcial hormesis,” can be deªned as a
beneªcial low-dose effect caused by a chemical that produces harmful effects at higher doses. For example, some studies report that low to moderate intake of alcohol has beneªcial effects (such as decreased mortality),
whereas high alcohol intake has negative effects (Davis and Svendsgaard
1990, pp. 76–77). A number of authors use this concept of chemical
hormesis (e.g., Teeguarden, et al. 1998; Turturro, et al. 1998), perhaps because of its relatively clear implications for public policy (see, e.g.,
Calabrese 1996). If beneªcial low-dose effects could be shown to be
generalizable, changes might be warranted in dose-response models, dose
scales, and risk characterizations in risk assessment, along with changes in
hazardous waste cleanup requirements and “changes in health criteria for
all environmental standards” (Calabrese and Baldwin 1999b, p. 723; see
also Sielken and Stevenson 1998, pp. 259–262).
Others warn, however, that the concept of beneªcial hormesis may not
be acceptable (Elliott 2000, pp. 191–192; Davis and Farland 1998,
p. 380; Davis and Svendsgaard 1990, pp. 79–80). One obvious difªculty
is that the concept of beneªciality appears to be normative as opposed to
being straightforwardly descriptive or empirical; therefore, it may be
difªcult to provide uncontroversial criteria for what is and what is not a
beneªcial response. Even if this initial difªculty is overcome, however,
three further problems remain. First, it is very difªcult to determine
whether or not a particular response is actually beneªcial; a response
might appear to be beneªcial in the short term but prove to be harmful in
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the long term. Second, an apparently beneªcial response could involve side
effects that are ultimately deleterious. For example, Calabrese and Baldwin
note that “stimulation of detoxifying enzyme levels observed in the larval
form of a species would be evaluated for its hormetic potential even
though this increased metabolic activity, while beneªcial in the
short-term, may have a detrimental effect on other endpoints” (1998b,
p. II-5). Third, because of the varying circumstances and physiological characteristics of different individuals, the evaluation of a particular effect as
“beneªcial” or “harmful” could vary from individual to individual. For example, alcohol intake tends to decrease blood pressure, so moderate intake
of alcohol might signiªcantly decrease the mortality rate of those who suffer from hypertension but moderately increase the mortality rate of some
other population groups. Or, as Davis and Svendsgaard point out, daily intake of aspirin could be beneªcial for some individuals (by decreasing
their risk of heart disease) but harmful for other individuals (by increasing
their risk of hemorrhagic stroke) (1990, p. 79).
Unfortunately, all three of the preceding operational concepts can also
be criticized for excluding some effects that many researchers regard as instances of chemical hormesis (such as curves that exhibit thresholds because of difªculties in measuring low-dose effects) and including some effects that are often considered to be non-hormetic (such as the effects of
essential nutrients). On the one hand, Calabrese and Baldwin note that if
the background level of a particular endpoint is particularly low or high,
it may not be possible to observe inhibition or stimulation (respectively)
of the endpoint that occurs at low doses. So, for example, if tumor incidence occurs relatively rarely in a particular population, a hormetic effect
that decreases tumor incidence might result in a curve with a threshold below which no effect is observed rather than in a U-shaped dose-response
curve. Calabrese and Baldwin suggest that effects of this sort should be
considered hormetic, but all three preceding concepts of chemical
hormesis could be criticized for inappropriately excluding such phenomena.
On the other hand, essential nutrients, especially metals, produce
U-shaped dose-response curves that involve low-dose stimulation and
high-dose inhibition. Such phenomena are included in the scope of the
three preceding concepts, but most researchers do not consider them to be
instances of chemical hormesis (e.g., Davis and Svendsgaard 1990, p. 72).
Because of these difªculties involved in deªning chemical hormesis operationally, mechanistic concepts of chemical hormesis may be more helpful for future researchers. A fourth concept, “overcompensation hormesis,”
can be deªned as a biological response in which processes are stimulated to
above-normal levels in an attempt to restore organismal homeostasis after
it is altered by a toxic chemical (see ªgure 2). For example, the growth of
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Figure 2. Example of the temporal dependence of the dose-response relationships characteristic of overcompensation hormesis.
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peppermint plants is initially inhibited at all dose levels by treatment
with the growth retardant phosphon, but after two to ªve weeks of treatment, the plants exposed to low doses of phosphon appear to overcompensate to this stress, because they grow faster than controls (Calabrese and
Baldwin 1998c, pp. 354–355). Overcompensation hormesis, initially proposed by Anthony Stebbing, is the most widely accepted mechanistic concept of chemical hormesis. He suggests that hormetic effects on organism
growth are caused by overcompensation to perturbations in homeostasis
caused by toxic substances. The growth of organisms is monitored and
controlled by feedback processes, and he suggests that it is evolutionarily
advantageous for these feedback processes to respond to biological stressors by temporarily “overshooting” the return to homeostasis. This response prepares the organism for further disturbances, and the organism
gradually returns to a normal state if it is not disrupted further (Stebbing
1997, pp. 3–9). According to Calabrese and Baldwin, the distinctive characteristics of overcompensation hormesis are temporal: overcompensation
hormesis is unique in that a linear dose-response curve occurs shortly after
administration of a toxin, but the curve becomes U-shaped (representing
an overcompensation response at low dose levels) after the body’s feedback
mechanisms have time to respond (1998c, p. 354).
A ªfth concept, “direct stimulation hormesis,” can be deªned as a biological response in which low doses of a chemical directly stimulate a particular endpoint but inhibit the same endpoint at higher doses. Such apparent direct stimulation has been observed on the fermentation rate in
yeast exposed to arsenic, the rate of DNA synthesis in chick embryo cells
exposed to zinc, the prostate weight of male mice exposed to diethylstilbestrol, and numerous other endpoints (Calabrese and Baldwin 1998c,
p. 356). As mentioned in section I, this is the other broad type of chemical
hormesis reported in Calabrese and Baldwin’s literature search (1998b).
Calabrese and Baldwin acknowledge, however, that this concept of chemical hormesis actually encompasses an array of mechanisms rather than one
particular mechanism (1998c, p. 357). The stimulation could result from
the enhancement of phenomena such as mitosis, cell wall/membrane permeability, hormone secretion, repair of genetic material, energy utilization, nutrient uptake, or enzyme synthesis. Numerous other mechanisms
for “direct stimulation” hormesis revolve around the regulation of enzymatic reactions (1998c, p. 358). Because of this variability in underlying
mechanisms, the dose-response curves for direct-stimulation hormesis
were different, and much more varied, than the dose-response curves for
overcompensation hormesis observed in Calabrese and Baldwin’s study.
Stimulatory effects varied from the level of overcompensation hormesis
(around 150%) to at least 1000% of the control, and the hormetic dose
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range varied from the level of overcompensation hormesis (around
10-fold) up to about 30 million-fold in the studies that Calabrese and
Baldwin categorized as examples of “direct stimulation hormesis” (1998c,
p. 356).
A sixth mechanistic concept is “multiple-effects hormesis,” deªned as a
low-dose effect, opposite to that which occurs at higher doses, that is
caused by multiple biological effects of a chemical inºuencing the same
endpoint in different ways at different dose levels. Davis and Svendsgaard
hint at this concept of chemical hormesis (1990, p. 77).3 The effects of alcohol on human mortality appear to provide a good example of this concept of chemical hormesis. Alcohol stimulates levels of HDL cholesterol at
low doses (thus lowering risk of mortality by heart disease), but this positive effect is offset at high doses because of other effects that increase cancer risk. Calabrese and Baldwin do not appear to favor this concept of
chemical hormesis (personal communication). Nevertheless, it is possible
that some apparent cases of “direct stimulation” hormesis are actually the
result of multiple effects of chemicals. In fact, unless chemical “effects” are
deªned very precisely and directly, almost any U-shaped dose-response
curve could be attributed to multiple effects of a chemical. Even the “overcompensation” response observed by Stebbing might be describable as an
indirect, secondary effect of a chemical whose primary effect is the inhibition of an endpoint associated with growth.
None of these mechanisms, either alone or in combination, appears at
present to be a completely satisfactory concept of chemical hormesis. First,
the mechanisms are not precisely speciªed. The causal processes underlying direct stimulation hormesis are not understood. Thus, no criteria for
distinguishing instances of direct-stimulation hormesis (or even overcompensation hormesis) from multiple effects of a single chemical have presently been propounded. Second, a concept based on any combination of
these mechanisms is likely to exclude phenomena that some researchers
would consider hormetic. Davis and Svendsgaard report a variety of such
phenomena. The interactive effects of some metals may inhibit
carcinogenesis and produce U-shaped dose-response curves on certain endpoints. U-shaped dose-response curves could result from the potential for
organisms to adapt to chronic low-level exposures to a particular toxin.
Finally, organisms have numerous compensatory and protective mechanisms that defend the body against stressors and that may produce
3. Although Davis and Svendsgaard touch on this concept, it has not been emphasized
elsewhere in previous literature, but the validity of this mechanism was debated frequently
at a recent conference (“Chemical and Radiation Hormesis,” January 2000, at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst) on the evidence for chemical hormesis.
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above-normal effects on certain endpoints, at least for a time (1990,
pp. 77–78). Such mechanisms do not appear to represent instances of the
three preceding concepts of chemical hormesis.
A seventh concept of chemical hormesis, “adaptive hormesis,” may be
distinguished on the basis of its genesis. It is a low dose biological effect,
opposite to that which occurs at higher doses, that has developed as an
adaptive response to biological stressors. For example, Calabrese and
Baldwin argue that instances of overcompensation hormesis (such as the
growth response of peppermint plants to phosphon) are likely produced
by generalized adaptive strategies that have developed as a result of natural selection (1998b, p. VII-15). Such a genetic concept of chemical
hormesis has great plausibility, especially in combination with other operational or mechanistic concepts of chemical hormesis, because it provides
an evolutionary account that would explain the existence of hormetic effects. However, it appears inordinately difªcult to provide criteria for determining cases of adaptive hormesis. Thus, despite the suggestion of
Calabrese and Baldwin that instances of low-dose stimulation should be
considered hormetic only if they are adaptive (1998b, p. VII-1), it is probably unreasonably stringent to demand that a particular effect be shown to
have developed via adaptive processes before it can be regarded as an instance of chemical hormesis.
III. Ramifications of the Conceptual Clarification

If the preceding conceptual analysis of “chemical hormesis” is plausible,
then at least three ramiªcations should be considered. First, this analysis
supports moderate skepticism about the existence of chemical hormesis.
This is an epistemic claim concerning the warrant provided by current evidence for chemical hormesis. The conceptual analysis provided in this paper highlights the fact that a number of distinct mechanisms could be involved in the production of “hormetic-looking” effects in certain contexts,
and current evidence provides little information about the frequency and
conditions under which any single mechanism is operative. It is still possible, of course, that future evidence will support the existence of a
generalizable low-dose phenomenon to which the term “chemical
hormesis” can be appended. The phenomenon that presently seems most
likely to represent a unitary low-dose effect of toxic chemicals is the “overcompensation hormesis” observed by Stebbing and Calabrese and
Baldwin. Nevertheless, this phenomenon may be conªned to a circumscribed number of endpoints (e.g., growth) and may depend on carefully
circumscribed conditions (e.g., a suboptimal environment) (Calabrese and
Baldwin 1998c, p. 354; Vichi and Tritton 1989, p. 2679). Furthermore,
even if this is a replicable phenomenon, current evidence does not conªrm
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how often this particular low-dose effect occurs relative to other low-dose
effects of toxic chemicals. Therefore, even though Calabrese and Baldwin
have pointed to a number of sociological factors that may have contributed
to the past demise of the chemical hormesis hypothesis (1999b, p. 727;
2000e, p. 92), the philosophy-of-science analysis exhibited in this paper provides sufªcient warrant for rejecting the chemical hormesis hypothesis at
present.
The second ramiªcation of the foregoing conceptual analysis is that the
necessary and sufªcient conditions for conªrming the generalizability of
chemical hormesis are more complex than previous research suggests.
Given the multiplicity of concepts circulating in recent articles on chemical hormesis, it is necessary to specify the particular concept being studied
and to provide evidence for the generalizability of that particular phenomenon. In Calabrese and Baldwin’s literature search (Calabrese and Baldwin
1998b), their criteria were designed to uncover evidence of U-shaped
dose-response curve hormesis.4 However, they argued for the
generalizability of the hormetic phenomenon not based on the frequency
at which U-shaped dose-response curve hormesis was observed but rather
based on the plausibility of the existence of mechanistic concepts of
hormesis such as overcompensation and direct-stimulation. Unfortunately,
they did not provide evidence for the frequency at which any of these concepts of chemical hormesis occurred relative to non-hormetic doseresponse curves (Elliott 2000, pp. 181–185). Future research will need to
specify concepts of chemical hormesis more carefully in order to warrant
the acceptance of the hormesis hypothesis. As the introduction to this paper indicated, this should not be taken to imply that conceptual imprecision cannot play a productive role in scientiªc research; rather, it means
only that conceptual clariªcation may prove valuable in certain cases at
certain times.
The third ramiªcation of the conceptual analysis in section II is that the
implications of chemical hormesis for carcinogen risk assessment are unclear. The concept that has the clearest implications for risk assessment is
“beneªcial hormesis.” I have already argued, however, that this is an impractical concept because it is very difªcult to show that the beneªcial effects of a particular chemical occur over an extended period of time, for
most members of a population, without being outweighed by negative
side effects. The necessary and sufªcient conditions for showing that phe4. The criteria included the number of doses from each study that were below the
NOEL (no-observed-effect level), whether or not the NOEL was determined in the study,
the number of statistically signiªcant doses that showed a low-dose response opposite of
the high-dose response, the magnitude of response, and reproducibility of the data (1998b,
p. III-4).
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nomena corresponding to other concepts of chemical hormesis have
signiªcant implications for carcinogen risk assessment are difªcult to provide. Consider one necessary condition as an example: evidence will be
needed that hormetic effects occur with high frequency on endpoints that
reºect the entire process of carcinogenesis (e.g., incidence of cancer-related
illness or cancer-related mortality). This condition is necessary because a
carcinogenic chemical could have a hormetic effect on one cancer-related
endpoint (e.g., DNA repair enzyme activity) but have other short- or
long-term side effects that increase the overall chance of suffering harm on
more signiªcant endpoints such as cancer-related illness or mortality
(Elliott 2000, pp. 187–190). This point is closely related to
Shrader-Frechette’s claims (this issue, section 4) that it is questionable to
infer, based on short-term studies of only a few biological endpoints, that
beneªcial radiation hormesis effects occur. If changes in the current default models of risk assessment are to be considered (e.g., eliminating the
current assumption that there is no threshold for the harmful effects of
carcinogens), sufªcient evidence must exist that hormetic effects occur on
endpoints that reºect the entire process of carcinogenesis (e.g., endpoints
like cancer-related illness or mortality).
Unfortunately, evidence of this sort is not easy to marshal once speciªc
concepts of chemical hormesis are carefully considered. Calabrese and
Baldwin have noted that low-dose biological effects on endpoints such as
cancer-related mortality are very difªcult to determine, because they require the use of epidemiological studies (1998b, p. VIII-33). One reason
for this difªculty is that these low-dose effects are typically small, so a very
large sample size is needed in order to obtain statistically signiªcant effects in an epidemiological study. Therefore, it will be very difªcult to
show that operational concepts such as U-shaped dose-response curve
hormesis are applicable to the endpoints that are truly signiªcant for risk
assessment. Mechanistic concepts of hormesis appear to show more promise
for impacting risk-assessment practice, because a mechanistic link could
potentially be demonstrated between easily measured phenomena (such as
an overcompensation response on certain endpoints) and effects on more
signiªcant endpoints such as cancer-related mortality. Unfortunately, the
preceding conceptual clariªcation suggests that there may be so many different mechanisms involved in the production of hormetic-looking effects
that it will be very difªcult to relate all these different mechanistic phenomena with effects on endpoints that are important for risk assessment.
Nevertheless, the analysis provided in this paper suggests a positive
project for future research concerning hormetic phenomena and their applicability to risk assessment. First, researchers should probably focus attention on several speciªc mechanistic phenomena and elucidate criteria for
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distinguishing different mechanistic phenomena from one another. The
“overcompensation hormesis” observed by Calabrese and Baldwin and
Stebbing may constitute a particularly promising phenomenon for further
research, because its temporal dependence provides a relatively straightforward operational means of distinguishing it from other low-dose phenomena. Second, experiments designed to provide statistical evidence for
the frequency with which particular chemicals produce these speciªc mechanistic
phenomena in speciªc organisms under speciªc conditions (e.g., suboptimal as
opposed to optimal environments) will do much to increase the warrant
for those speciªc hormetic phenomena.
Third, convincing arguments for some degree of generalizability of these
phenomena might involve either elucidation of the physiological pathways associated with these speciªc phenomena or statistically supported
evidence that these speciªc phenomena occur with high frequency in certain classes of organisms (e.g., plants) as a result of exposure to certain
chemical classes (e.g., metal salts). Fourth, application of these phenomena
to public policy will require evidence that the interactive effects of multiple
toxic chemicals on these mechanistic phenomena will result in long-term
beneªcial low-dose effects on endpoints that reºect the entire process of
carcinogenesis. Experiments designed to elucidate the likely interactive and
long-term effects of chemicals on the physiological pathways shown to be
associated with the hormetic phenomena, together with an evaluation of
the relationship between these physiological pathways and endpoints that
are signiªcant for risk assessment (such as cancer-related mortality), might
prove valuable in this context.
Conclusion

This paper argued for three theses concerning the epistemological warrant
for the existence and generalizability of chemical hormesis. The ªrst section of the paper argued that the different concepts of chemical hormesis
employed by proponents and opponents of the hormetic hypothesis support different conclusions about the plausibility and generalizability of
chemical hormesis. Section II analyzed seven concepts of chemical
hormesis, arguing that each is unsatisfactory considering the state of present research. Finally, the last section argued that this conceptual analysis,
which highlights the potentially diverse low-dose effects of toxic chemicals, suggests that chemical hormesis may not exist, that the necessary and
sufªcient conditions for conªrming the generalizability of chemical
hormesis are more complex than has been recognized formerly, and that
the implications of chemical hormesis for carcinogen risk assessment are
unclear. This analysis should contribute to ongoing scientiªc understanding of chemical hormesis and of its implications for public policy. It also
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provides a case study supporting the positive role that philosophy-ofscience approaches such as conceptual clariªcation can play in addressing
scientiªc disputes, including disputes concerning policy-related science
that might appear to be driven by social or political considerations.
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